This case involved a motorcycle accident that occurred while Plaintiff was returning
from a trip to Laughlin. Plaintiff was riding as a passenger on Defendant’s motorcycle
when the rear spokes failed ejecting Plaintiff off the motorcycle.

Defendant had purchased the subject motorcycle from Defendant motorcycle shop
and then purchased the spokes for the motorcycle from Defendant shop owner who
installed the spokes. Based on information and belief, the manufacturer-distributor of the
spokes were Defendant manufacturer.

Prior to leaving on his trip to Laughlin, Defendant motorcycle rider had taken the
subject motorcycle to Defendant’s shop for a safety inspection since the bike had a missing
spoke on the rear rim. Defendant motorcycle rider had informed the service writer that he
was going to Laughlin Run and that he had noticed that a spoke had broken from the rear
wheel. During the same visit, the service writer also informed Defendant Motorcycle rider
that the subject motorcycle was due for the 1000 mile service and the service was
performed.

The employee of Defendant motorcycle shop admitted that he checked Defendant
Motorcycle rider’s spoke tightness during the 1,000 service, making minor adjustments to
the spokes as necessary. When Defendant motorcycle rider picked up his motorcycle from
Defendant’s motorcycle shop, the service writer informed Defendant motorcyclist that
“Maybe we’ll see you in Laughlin” and that he was “good to go.” Additionally, in the
recommendation section of the repair invoice, the motorcycle shop Defendant provided to
the motorcyclist the vague and ambiguous notation that “everything on service seems
good, customer has one missing spoke on rear rim.” When Defendant motorcyclist
reviewed the recommendation section, he interpreted the recommendation to mean that
a safety inspection had been performed and the spoke was inclusive in that inspection.

In route to Laughlin, several additional spokes broke. Defendant motorcyclist
stopped at another motorcycle shop and had the spokes repaired.
When returning from Laughlin, Nevada to California on the I-40 highway at
approximately 65 mph, the rear wheel spokes broke, puncturing the rear tire causing the
motorcycle to loose control and eject plaintiff.

Plaintiff’s motorcycle expert who had forty-two (42) years of experience in the field of
maintenance and repair of motorcycles was of the opinion that even with one missing spoke,
if the Subject Spokes had been properly tightened and trued and if no manufacturing
defect existed, the Subject Spokes would not have broken leading to the subject accident.
Additionally, defendants failed to properly warn Defendant motorcyclist that the Subject
Spokes which, were after-market stainless steel spokes, were not as strong as stock spokes.
The court in Janofsky v. Garland, (1941) 42 Cal. App. 2d 655, 658 held that when a
[person/entity] makes repairs and gives a deceptive appearance of safety and leads one to use the
[product] in a way which but for the repairs one would recognize to be dangerous, the [person or
entity] is liable for resulting injuries.

Following the accident, Plaintiff had to be air-lifted to the hospital in Needles,
California for emergency care and then transferred to Hoag Memorial Hospital with a
comminuted right olecranon fracture. At Hoag Memorial Hospital, Plaintiff had to
underwent surgery involving a open reduction internal fixation of her right olecranon
fracture.

During surgery the fracture fragments from the fracture were identified and noted
to be severely comminuted. Portions of the bone had to removed. The fragments were
mobilized and held in place with K wires. Additionally, wires were placed through the bone
and then around the fracture and under the triceps tendon. Pins were inserted to stabilize
the fractures. Following the surgical procedure Ms. Del Grosso had to undergo physical
therapy.

This action involved a tragic incident, wherein Plaintiff got shocked-electrocuted as
a result of a defective/improperly installed sign mounted on the outside wall of Defendant’s
property/store which was not grounded.

On the day of the incident, Plaintiff was at the subject store with his co-worker
installing a refrigeration system. As part of the installation, Plaintiff had to install a
compressor on the roof and in order to get to the roof, Plaintiff used a ladder which he
placed against the subject sign. Plaintiff had to place the ladder against the subject sign
because of other machinery/equipment nearby. At the end of the day, the timer turned on
and energized the subject sign. As such, when Plaintiff was attempting to climb down the
ladder he got shocked-electrocuted causing Plaintiff to fall approximately 12 feet to the
ground.

As a result of the incident, Plaintiff sustained severe injuries including but not limited
to requiring back surgery.

The owner of the subject store as well as owners of the subject property and their
agents failed to remedy a known dangerous condition. Defendants knew or should have
know that the subject sign was not grounding posing as a dangerous condition.
In fact, immediately following the incident, investigation into the matter was
conducted by Plaintiff’s expert. Inspection of the Electrical Sign revealed that the sign
emitted electrical current because of improper wiring in violation of applicable electrical
code requirements. The defect in the subject sign was created and allowed to exist by
Defendants as set forth below.

Based on information and belief, prior to the subject incident, Defendants leased the
store which had the subject sign mounted on the outside wall to Defendant store owner.
Based on information and belief, the subject sign was repaired-modified by unlicenced
improperly trained electrical technicians.

The court in Grant v. Hipsher, (1967) 257 Cal. App.2d 375, 381, citing to the case
of Finnegan v. Royal Realty Co. (1950) 35 Cal.2d 409, held that where a tenant makes a
structural change which is in violation of safety regulations and the owner had knowledge
of the change, a duty is imposed upon the owner to terminate the tenancy or compel the
tenant to comply with the regulations. The court further held that while the Finnegan case
in which the foregoing principles were enunciated involved structural aspects of a building,
no rational basis exist for holding the distinction to be of controlling significance if fencing
of a swimming pool is involved instead. Id. at 382. The court held that a fence enclosing
a swimming pool is as much a part of the permanent improvements of the demised
premises as the exit door or the sprinkler system involved in Finnegan case, and the extent
of the lessor's duty to see that such improvements conform to applicable safety ordinances
should be no less. Id.

The court in Lopez v. Superior Court, (1996) 45 Cal. App. 4 , 705, 715, held that th
“where there is a duty to exercise reasonable care in the inspection of premises for
dangerous conditions, the lack of awareness of the dangerous condition does not generally
preclude liability. Although liability might easily be found where the landowner has actual
knowledge of the dangerous condition "[t]he landowner's lack of knowledge of the
dangerous condition is not a defense. Id. He has an affirmative duty to exercise ordinary
care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition, and therefore must inspect them
or take other proper means to ascertain their condition. Id. And if, by the exercise of
reasonable care, he would have discovered the dangerous condition, he is liable. Id.”
The court in Mora v. Baker Commodities, Inc., (1989) 210 Cal. App. 3d 771, 781,
held that a commercial landowner, cannot totally abrogate its landowner responsibilities
merely by signing a lease. As the owner of property, a lessor out of possession must
exercise due care and must act reasonably toward the tenant as well as to unknown third
persons. Id. The court further held that at the time the lease is executed and upon
renewal a landlord has a right to re-enter the property, has control of the property, and
must inspect the premises to make the premises reasonably safe from dangerous
conditions. Id.

The court in Finnegan v. Royal Realty Co. (1950) 35 Cal.2d 409, 423, held that
statutes and ordinances prescribing the safety features of buildings impose a duty of
compliance upon the property owner. Where such a statute or ordinance fails to designate
the person charged with the duty of compliance, the initial responsibility is that of the
owner. Id. The court further held that if a landlord may delegate his duty of compliance
with safety ordinances and statutes designed for the protection of members of the public
rightfully on the premises to persons who may be financially irresponsible, all salutary
legislation would soon become a nullity. Id. at 432-433. The situation is somewhat
analogous to that of one who employs an independent contractor. Id. at 433. Where the
law imposes a definite, affirmative duty upon one by reason of his relationship with others,
whether as an owner or proprietor of land or chattels or in some other capacity, such
person can not escape liability for a failure to perform the duty thus imposed by entrusting
it to an independent contractor. Id. And it is immaterial whether the duty thus regarded
as 'nondelegable' be imposed by statute.

As a result of the tragic incident, Plaintiff had to be transported by ambulance to
UCSD Medical Center. Plaintiff was examination and diagnosed with an L4 burst fracture,
pedicle fractures bilaterally at L5 and chronic diagnosis of isthmic spondylolisthesis, grade
1 at L5-S1. Based on the forgoing diagnosis, Plaintiff was taken to the operating room
and underwent an L3-S1 posterior fusion. Following his initial L3-S1 posterior fusion,
Plaintiff had to undergo another surgery for fixation-stabilization of his L4 burst fracture.
As a result of the subject accident, despite the surgery and physical therapy
treatment Plaintiff continued to experience restrictions even in his daily routine activities.

This action involved a tragic incident wherein Plaintiff sustained severe scarring to
her arm as a result of a vicious attach by Defendant’s dog.

On July 19, 2004, while Plaintiff was walking at the La Cienega Park with her
friends, Defendant’s dog, a rottweiler named chase, suddenly without any warning,
attacked Plaintiff and bit her right arm. “Chase” did not simply bite and let go of Plaintiff’s
arm, but instead, chase locked unto Plaintiff’s arm and pulled her to the ground without let
go until he tore off the flesh off of Plaintiff’s right arm. As a result, Plaintiff had to be
transported to Cedar Sinai Hospital for emergency care.

Prior to the subject incident, Defendant’s dog, bit another person on July 31, 2003.
A lawsuit regarding the prior dog bite incident was also litigated and was successful.
Furthermore, based on information and belief, Chase bit Defendant’s own child as well.

March 7, 2004.
At Cedar Sinai Hospital the wound was treated and Plaintiff was given pain
medication, Motrin, Vicodin and Augmentin to relieve the pain. Plaintiff was also
prescribed a Carter pillow to help elevate her arm.

On July 20, 2004, Plaintiff was referred by Cedar Sinai Hospital to a plastic surgeon
for consultation. Examination revealed a 12cm laceration extending over the dorsal
surface of the proximal forearm. Also, a creation of a flap of tissue extending
approximately 5-8 cm distally was noted. The area of scarring was noted to be 12cm long
and 8cm wide. The plastic surgeon diagnosed the wound to be complex with multiple
areas of devitalized tissue and noted that even with skin graft coverage, Plaintiff would
have scar formation even with the best surgical technique.

Despite the skin graft surgical procedure, Plaintiff ended up having a permanent
scar on her right arm. The scar to Plaintiff’s arm not only affected her emotionally but the
scarring was traumatizing to her family and newly wed husband. Plaintiff would find herself
thinking about the way the scar looked on her arm and felt less attractive because of the
scarring. The scars also affected Plaintiff’s ability to enjoy her daily life activities. Plaintiff
was required to avoid sun exposure and such restriction took away a lot of pleasures out
of her life because Plaintiff had to mak sure that she wore clothing to cover her scar.
Plaintiff also experienced difficulty in engaging in simple daily life activities such as
eating, brushing her teeth, blowing her nose, laughing as well as other related activities for
a period of time until the scar tissues from the bite healed.

LIABILITY
"The owner of any dog is liable for the damages suffered by any person who is
bitten by the dog while in a public place or lawfully in a private place, including the property
of the owners of the dog, regardless of the former viciousness of the dog or the owner's
knowledge of such viciousness." (C.C. 3342(a); see Hicks v. Sullivan (1932) 122 C.A. 635,
639; DeLay v. Braun (1944) 63 C.A.2d 8, 10; Ellsworth v. Elite Dry Cleaners, Dyers &
Laundry (1954) 127 C.A.2d 479, 483 [sufficiency of evidence of ownership of dog]; Davis
v. Gaschler (1992) 11 C.A.4th 1392, 1399 [C.C. 3342 imposes liability on owner regardless
of whether dog is running loose or restrained, or is on or off owner's premises]; Drake v.
Dean (1993) 15 C.A.4th 915, 19 C.R.2d 325; Johnson v. McMahan (1998) 68 C.A.4th 173,
175, [plaintiff who pleaded that he was injured in falling from ladder after dog had grasped
his leg alleged "bite" under C.C. 3342, even though skin was not broken and no wound
inflicted].

The court in People v. Henderson, (1999) 76 Cal. App.4th 453, 470, allowed expert
evidence to establish that as a breed, pit bulls are capable of inflicting great bodily injury
or death due to their tremendous biting power and a tendency to lock onto their victim
without letting go. The expert also testified that untrained dogs pose a greater risk of harm
to outsiders. Id

The appellant in People v. Henderson argued that the expert's testimony was
insufficient to show that the particular dogs in question were capable of inflicting great
bodily injury or death. Id. The court held that appellant was mistaken since the expert's
testimony referenced pit bulls as a breed. Id. The court found that the subject pit bulls at
Defendant’s address fell within that group. Id. The court held that what was lacking was
any evidence to show that the dogs in question were somehow distinct from their breed
and therefore they should be excluded from that generalization. Id. The court found that
indeed, other evidence showed that the subject particular dogs were ready and willing to
attack. Id.

This action involved a trip and fall accident that occurred in the evening when
Plaintiff, his wife and his friends were patrons of Defendant’s restaurant in Santa Barbara.

At approximately 9:30 p.m. Plaintiff left the restaurant exiting the side entrance-exit
doorway leading to the parking lot. It was dark, the light fixture on top of the doorway was
burned out and there were no lights in the parking lot. According to witnesses the light had
been out for several days. In addition to the lack of lighting, the landing for the subject
doorway was uneven. The right side of the landing extended out only 38 inches while the
left side extended out 5 feet and 6 inches.

As a result of the insufficient lighting and unevenness in the landing, Plaintiff’s right
leg first stepped down unto the parking lot while his left leg remained on the landing
causing him to lose his balance and fall sustaining severe injuries.

Plaintiff maintained that Defendant created a dangerous condition at its premises
by installing the subject side entrance-exit doorway where the landing was uneven. The
dangerous condition was made worse when Defendants failed to provide sufficient lighting
at the subject doorway.

When the subject premises was built, the landing was even in size and the exit did
not exist. The landing was later modified into its current condition when the parking lot
design was changed from diagonal parking spaces to straight parking spaces. Thereafter,
the subject exit doorway was constructed without obtaining a permit. A permit for the
subject exit doorway would have required the landing for such doorway to be at least five
(5) feet. Additionally, the Uniform Building Code required that there be at least 44 inches
of landing when the door opens. When the door to the side entrance/exit opened, it took
over half of the landing to where the next step on the right side was the parking lot while
on the left side there is more landing creating a trip and fall accident hazard.

In regard to illumination, the Uniform Building Code (hereinafter UBC) required that
one (1) foot candle of lighting be provided. An inspection of the subject premises
conducted under similar circumstances revealed that the measure of light for the subject
doorway and the parking lot was in the range of 0.06 to 0.13. The measure of lighting for
the subject doorway was only 0.06. However, on another inspection, the measure of light
was higher, because Defendant had installed light fixtures in the patio leading to the
subject doorway and rope lighting around the building.

The light measurements taken by Defendant’s expert revealed that the light source
was less than one (1) foot candle of lighting required by Uniform Building Code. Even
assuming any light source existed at the doorway, it would be blocked by the human body
upon exiting the doorway especially when reaching the curb at the landing.

When an unsafe condition in premises causes injury to business invitee, and has
been created by owner of property or by employee within scope of his employment,
knowledge of dangerous condition is imputed to owner and invitee need not prove owner's
notice or knowledge of it. Sanders v. MacFarlanes Candies, 119 Cal. App.2d 497 (1953).
Although obviousness of a danger may relieve property owner of duty to warn of its
existence, it will not necessarily relieve him of duty to remedy a danger if property owner
can foresee that, despite its obviousness, danger may cause injury, as when necessity
requires persons to encounter it. Osborn v. Missions Ready Mix, 224 Cal. App.3d 104.

This matter involves a tragic incident wherein Defendant’s employee took Plaintiff
a minor child, into the X-ray dark room and sexually molested him by taping his eyes shut.

On the day of the incident, Plaintiff was accompanied by his mother and younger
sister who had visited Defendants’ dental office for dental work. Both the minor child and
his younger sister were supposed to be seen at the same time. However, Defendant’s
employee only called the minor child in to be seen first. The minor’s mother attempted to
accompany the minor, but Defendant’s employee used his authoritative position and
coerced the minor’s mother to stay in the waiting room with the minor’s younger sister.
Once Defendant’s employee took the minor, none of Defendants’ employees, including the
dentist on duty, inquired from Defendant employee as to why he was taking the minor into
the X-ray dark room. Defendant’s employee walked the minor through the common office
areas to the dark room. Defendant’s employee was, therefore, allowed to use his
authoritative position to coerce the minor into the X-ray dark room and to place tape over
the minor’s eyes. Despite the tape over the minor’s eyes, the minor was able to see
underneath the tape when Defendant’s employee sexually molested the minor.

After sexually molesting the minor, Defendant’s employee took the minor to one of
the dental chairs and called the minor’s mother and little sister into the office. The minor
was upset and fearing that Defendant’s employee would also sexually molest his younger
sister was hysterically crying. The minor called out to his mother to not allow Defendant’s
employee to be alone with his younger sister. The minor then informed his mother how
Defendant’s employee had sexually molested him.

Defendants attempted to prevent the crime from being reported and refused to call
the police. Thereafter, plaintiffs employer called the police and investigation confirmed that
Defendant’s employee had sexually molested the minor. Defendant’s employee plead
guilty and is now serving a lengthy jail sentence.

Defendants should have never allowed their employee to be alone with the minor
child. Defendant’s employee had a known history of multiple felonies. Additionally,
Defendant’s employee had been allowed by Defendants to work as an x-ray technician
even though Defendant’s employee was not a licenced x-ray technician. Interestingly,
Defendants’ own policies provided that Defendants would not hire nor keep as an
employee anyone who has a criminal history of felonies and/or is not a licenced x-ray
technician. Defendants’ own policies provided that if they discovered that an employee
had a criminal history of felonies and/or the x-ray technician was not licensed, it would be
grounds for immediate termination.

LIABILITY

Plaintiffs contended that Defendants were liable for their employee’s wrongful acts
not only based on a theory of vicarious liability but directly for the negligent hiring and
supervision of their employee.

The California Supreme Court in Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital
held that an employer is vicariously liable for the torts of its employees committed within
the scope of the employment. Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital, (1995)
12 Cal. 4th 291, 296. The California Supreme Court further held that equally well
established, is the principle that an employee's willful, malicious and even criminal torts
may fall within the scope of his or her employment for purposes of respondeat superior,
even though the employer has not authorized the employee to commit crimes or intentional
torts. Id. at 297.

The court in Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital held that while the
employee need not have intended to further the employer's interests, the employer will be
liable if there is a causal nexus to the employee's work or if the act could have been
foreseen by the employer. Id. at 297, 299. The “foreseeability” test is met if, in the context
of the particular enterprise, the employee's conduct is not so “unusual or startling” that it
would seem “unfair” to factor the liability into the employer's cost of doing business. Id. at
299.

The court in Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital held that
foreseeability test is useful “because it reflects the central justification for respondeat
superior [liability]: that losses fairly attributable to an enterprise-those which foreseeably
result from the conduct of the enterprise-should be allocated to the enterprise as a cost of
doing business.” Id. at 299.

In the case at hand, it was foreseeable that because Defendants hired an employee
with a criminal history of felonies, a person who was misrepresenting that he was a
licensed x-ray technician, that minor children would be at risk for inappropriate conduct if
they allowed such an employee to bring little boys alone into a dark, windowless x-ray
room. If the conduct was foreseeable under the totality of circumstances as set forth in the
cases above, Defendant is 100% vicariously liable for the conduct of its employee.

If Defendant’s employee’s wrongful conduct falls outside the employment
relationship or scope of employment, thereby precluding respondeat superior liability, the
injured party may nevertheless be able to hold the employer directly liable on a theory of
negligent hiring and/or supervision. Liability for negligent hiring/supervision is based on the
theory that if an enterprise hires an incompetent or unfit employee with characteristics that
might pose a danger to persons the employee is expected to come into contact with in the
employment relationship (e.g., customers, other employees), the enterprise should bear
the loss caused by the employee's wrongdoing. See Hawkins v. Wilton (2006) 144 CA4th
936, 944, 51 CR3d 1, 6—“an employer cannot allow a drug-addled convicted felon to carry
and brandish loaded firearms during the course and scope of employment, particularly
where, as here, the employment necessarily consists of making contact with members of
the public.”

Liability for negligent hiring and supervision is based upon the reasoning that if an
enterprise hires individuals with characteristics which might pose a danger to customers
or other employees, the enterprise should bear the loss caused by the wrongdoing of its
incompetent or unfit employees. Mendoza, v. City of Los Angeles, (1998) 66 Cal. App. 4th
1333, 1339. In California, an employer can be held liable for negligent hiring if he knows
the employee is unfit, or has reason to believe the employee is unfit or fails to use
reasonable care to discover the employee's unfitness before hiring him. (See 53 Am.
Jur.2d. Master and Servant, §422, pp. 436-437.)

Defendant’s were negligent in the supervision of their business which directly led to
the molestation. Defendant’s employee took the minor child directly in front of the other
staff when he was not supposed to, to a place in the office he was not supposed to take
anyone. Defendant’s employee walked the minor child through the office in “broad
daylight” so to say, into the x-ray developing room. The minor child was not supposed to
be taken to have x-rays and certainly not alone with a felon in an x-ray dark room. Also,
Defendant’s employee right in front of Defendant’s other employees, prevented Plaintiff’s
mother from accompanying him which should have put the other Defendants on notice of
the suspicious conduct of their employee.

Plaintiff’s experts will testify that defendant’s had insufficient office policies and that
no employee should be permitted to take minor children alone into private rooms.

In the case at hand, Defendants were negligent in hiring and supervision of their
employee. If Defendants exercised due care in selecting an employee, they would have
discovered the fact that their employee had a criminal history of felonies and that he was
misrepresenting that he was licensed. Defendants then would have had reason to know
that their employee had character flaws that made him unsuitable and unsafe to be
allowed to take small children into a dark room with no windows.

This accident involved a tragic car versus pedestrian accident, wherein Defendant
recklessly ran through the crosswalk, at a residential intersection, and struck Plaintiffs in
the middle of the crosswalk. As a result of the collision, the entire family sustained severe
injuries.

At the time of the accident, all four (4) plaintiffs were crossing the intersection in a
marked crosswalk. Defendant was traveling southbound delivering pizza for his employer,
and claimed that he did not see any of the plaintiffs. A witness was traveling northbound
and approaching the subject intersection when he noticed the Plaintiff’s family entering the
crosswalk from the northeast corner and walk westbound. The witness noticed that
Defendant did not appear to see the Plaintiffs so he began to honk his horn to warn of the
accident. Defendant nevertheless failed to notice the entire family and struck the entire
family in the crosswalk.

Plaintiffs’ minor daughter testified that her parents had taught her to always look
both ways whenever crossing the street. Plaintiff’s daughter further testified that on the day
of the accident prior to entering the crosswalk, she looked both ways and only saw a
vehicle at a far distance. Plaintiff’s daughter further testified that she had no warning
whatsoever prior to being struck.

Defendant was traveling at the rate of speed of 30-35 mph through a residential
intersection with a speed limit of 25 mph when he struck the entire family. Defendant
admitted to the reporting officer that prior to reaching the subject residential intersection,
he noticed another vehicle traveling the opposite direction with its high beams on which
caused him to “squint and reduce his vision”. Defendant further admitted that as he
approached the intersection, traveling at 30-35 mph, he then heard something strike the
front of his vehicle and then shatter his windshield.

California Vehicle Code § 21950. Right-of-way at crosswalks provides:
(a) The driver of a vehicle shall yield the right-of-way to a pedestrian crossing the
roadway within any marked crosswalk or within any unmarked crosswalk at an
intersection, except as otherwise provided in this chapter.
(b) This section does not relieve a pedestrian from the duty of using due care for his
or her safety. No pedestrian may suddenly leave a curb or other place of safety and
walk or run into the path of a vehicle that is so close as to constitute an immediate
hazard. No pedestrian may unnecessarily stop or delay traffic while in a marked or
unmarked crosswalk.
(c) The driver of a vehicle approaching a pedestrian within any marked or unmarked
crosswalk shall exercise all due care and shall reduce the speed of the vehicle or
take any other action relating to the operation of the vehicle as necessary to
safeguard the safety of the pedestrian.
(d) Subdivision (b) does not relieve a driver of a vehicle from the duty of exercising
due care for the safety of any pedestrian within any marked crosswalk or within any
unmarked crosswalk at an intersection.

 Defendant blamed the witness for flashing his high beams to alert him and also tried
to blame the City claiming an unsafe crosswalk.

This action involved an car vs car accident, wherein the Defendant negligently
crossed through a stop sign on Olympic Boulevard and broadsided Plaintiff’s vehicle who
was traveling eastbound on Olympic Boulevard. As a result of the collision, Plaintiff’s
vehicle was pushed into the sidewalk striking a pole and causing the airbag to be deployed.

 Despite the fact that Plaintiff was wearing her seat belt, the severity of the impact
and deployment of the airbag caused her to lose consciousness and to sustain severe
injuries including but not limited to a fracture of her C2 vertebrae.

The reporting officer found Defendant to have been the cause of the accident by
violating California Vehicle Code, §218029(a) for failing to yield the right of way to Plaintiff.
The reporting officer also noted that Plaintiff’s vehicle had sustained major damage and
to be undriveable. Plaintiff’s vehicle was declared a total loss.

At the time of the accident, Defendant was within the course and scope of
employment.

As a result of the accident Plaintiff sustained severe injuries requiring neck surgery
at the C2 level as well as a subsequent throat surgery which had occurred as result of the
intubation from Plaintiff’s C2 cervical surgery. Additionally, Plaintiff was diagnosed as a
surgical candidate for shoulder surgery. The Plaintiff also suffered brain injury as
evidenced by the loss of consciousness. Plaintiff was diagnosed to have an impaired
memory which severely impacted her life not only requiring her to stop working but
requiring her to write reminders for herself. Plaintiff frequently misplaced objects and in
particular had difficulty remembering names and telephone numbers. Plaintiff also had
difficulty with concentration as well as having difficulty with multitasking and word finding.
Plaintiff also found herself to lose her train of thought in the middle of her conversations.

As a result of the injuries sustained from the accident, Plaintiff was unable to and/or
had difficulty engaging in her normal daily activities such as grocery shopping, cleaning her
house, sleeping, and working.

This accident occurred while Plaintiff was shopping at Defendant’s supermarket for produce. Plaintiff was walking towards the store rack where bananas are shelved, when
he tripped and fell over a box that had been left on the floor. The box had been left on the corner of the aisle extending out into the walkway leading to the racks.

At the time of the incident, Plaintiff was looking at Defendant’s merchandise when without any warning he tripped and fell onto the ground landing on his right side sustaining
a bruise to his hip. The warehouse manager was notified of the accident. Not only was Plaintiff in a state of shock but since Plaintiff was unable to move, he remained on the floor
for about fifteen (15) minutes to see if he could stand up on his own. Plaintiff was unable to stand up on his own and the paramedics were called by the Defendant to render
emergency care to Plaintiff.

Plaintiff was taken to UCLA hospital for emergency care and he was diagnosed to have a fractured femur bone. Plaintiff was operated on twice on different dates and
hospitalized. After being discharged from the hospital, Plaintiff sought rehabilitation therapy which did not assist in recovery of his injuries.

Plaintiff contended that storekeepers are under duty to use ordinary care to keep the floors of their premises reasonably safe for the business invitees who must pass over
them. Tuttle v. Crawford, 8 Cal.2d 126, 130.

Although obviousness of a danger may relieve property owner of duty to warn of its existence, it will not necessarily relieve him of duty to remedy danger if property owner can
foresee that, despite its obviousness, danger may cause injury, as when necessity requires persons to encounter it. Osborn v. Missions Ready Mix, 224 Cal. App.3d 104.

Moreover, when an unsafe condition in premises causes injury to business invitee, and has been created by owner of property or by employee within scope of his
employment, knowledge of dangerous condition is imputed to owner and invitee need not prove owner's notice or knowledge of it. Sanders v. MacFarlanes Candies, 119 Cal.App.2d 497 (1953).

If owner operates a self-service grocery store, where customers are invited to inspect, remove, and replace goods on shelves, the exercise of ordinary care may require
the owner to take greater precautions and make more frequent inspections than would otherwise be needed to safeguard against the possibility that such a customer may create
a dangerous condition by disarranging the merchandise and creating potentially hazardous conditions. Oretega v. Kmart Corportion, 26 Cal.4th 1200.

Defendant did not have any documentation or evidence to show that inspection of the premises was made to remedy any dangerous conditions.

Evidence that an inspection has not been made within a particular period of time prior to an accident may warrant an inference in premises liability action that the defective
condition existed long enough so that a person exercising reasonable care would have discovered it. Id. Evidence that supermarket operator had not inspected aisle where
patron slipped on puddle of milk for at least 15 to 30 minutes, and that milk could have been on floor for as long as two hours, permitted reasonable inference in patron's premises
liability action that the dangerous condition existed long enough for it to be discovered by the owner. Id.

As a child Plaintiff suffered from polio resulting in a limp in his left leg rendering him partially disabled. Despite the limp, prior to the accident, Plaintiff was able to engage in
his daily life activities without restrictions. Although Plaintiff had a limp in his left leg, he did not need the assistance of a walker, cane, and/or wheelchair. After the accident, however,
Plaintiff’s daily life activities were adversely affected.

This accident involved a car vs car accident.

At the time of the accident, Plaintiff was completely stopped with the vehicle’s flashers on at a railroad crossing when suddenly without any warning, Defendant rearended
Plaintiff’s vehicle at a high rate of speed, 40-50 mph causing his van to be pushed over the tracks. Plaintiff’s van displayed a yellow and black sign stating “STOPS AT
RAILROAD CROSSING.” Plaintiff’s van displayed the forgoing sign since his job involved transportation of kids and Plaintiff was required by law to stop at Rail Road crossings.

Despite wearing their seat belts, as a result of the severe impact, Plaintiffs’ bodies were jolted forward and backward. The force of the impact caused Plaintiff’s seat to break
causing him to fall backwards. As a result of the subject accident, Plaintiff had to undergo spinal cord surgery at the C6-C7 level to gain relief from the disc rupture caused by the car accident.

The subject car accident drastically affected Plaintiff’s daily life activities.

This action involved an incident wherein Plaintiffs, both minors, were severely burned as a result of an explosion caused by Defendant’s water heater.

Defendant negligently designed and manufactured its products in a manner wherein the water heater sucked the flammable vapors from a nearby gasoline container and causing the container to explode.

Since the mid 1970s, Defendant had been aware that the fires/explosions similar to the case at hand often start after a common household product like gasoline, paint thinner, or some other cleaning solvent is spilled. The flammable vapors are heavier than air and tend to hug the floor and flow across it like a liquid. The fumes, which can travel long distances, ten (10) or more feet, get sucked into the air intake of the water heater’s pilot light and burner, and then burst into flames.

Prior to Plaintiffs severe burn injuries, Defendant have been aware of a simple solution that would simply involve retrofitting or recalling the subject heater and having the subject water heater raised 18 inches off the floor so that the pilot is moved away from the ground-hugging vapors to prevent ignitions. Despite being aware of the subject defect, and thousands of severe burn injuries, Defendant failed to remedy or sufficiently warn of the subject defect.

Also, during the mid 1990’s the water heater industry conducted research and development that lead to a flame retarding design that used a sealed combustion chamber,
a limited combustion air intake and a flame trap. The design traps flammable vapors, which are then burned inside the heater’s combustion chamber in a controlled process so
as to prevent a flash back. Other less technical designs were available such as using a direct vent water heater approach such that the combustion chamber is sealed and
combustion air is drawn into the combustion chamber from a higher elevation. Either of these designs, if implemented and marketed would have significantly reduced the
flammable vapor hazard and would have prevented the fire and serious burns that occurred. The subject water heater was defectively designed and manufactured since
subject water heater could ignite flammable vapors that were produced by inadvertently spilling a flammable liquid near it. The explosion was preventable.